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Alaska, Land of Paradox, is the
smallest state economically and
the largest geographically. With
personal income of less than $2
billion annually, it has only two
percent as much income as the
largest state (California); with an
area of over one-half million
square miles, it is twice as large
as the next-largest geographical
unit (Texas). At the same time, it
is both one of the poorest and
one of the richest states. One-
seventh of Alaska's total popula-
tion (and half of the native popu-
lation) are below the poverty
line, and the state is plagued by
the highest living costs in the
nation. Yet it has tremendous
unexploited wealth in its forests
and fisheries, and especially in its
petroleum resources. Most of
this wealth is centered in the
Prudhoe Bay field on the North
Slope facing the Arctic Ocean.
To a nation which runs on oil and
is increasingly worried about the
cost and availability of oil im-
ports, the discovery of a major
new field within its borders
comes as a godsend. Although
petroleum accounts for almost
one~halfof the nation's energy
requirements, the U.S. today
cannot meet its requirements
from its own resources. (Indeed,
three-fifths of the world's total
reserves are found in the politi-
cally unstable Persian Gulf area.)
Nonetheless, five years after the
discovery of the Prudhoe Bay
field, not a drop of oil has
reached the markets in the lower
48 states, largely because of the
environmental controversy over
the construction of the pipeline
designed to deliver the oil.
With the impending passage of
Congressional legislation gov-
erning pipeline rights of way,
construction finally may begin
early next spring. Oil would
begin flowing about three years
after that, and in the process,
would help transform this now
problem-ridden state. The bene-
fits from this oil bonanza are
discussed below, as are also the
economic and ecological costs of
exploiting this resource. First,
however, it is useful to review
the background to the North
Slope discovery, including the
long and still-unsettled contro-
versy over the best means of
bringing oil to market.
land of oil
Alaska's petroleum wealth first
entered the news a half-century
ago, when several firms began
investigating oil seepages along
the Arctic coast reported by Es-
kimos and early traders. Presi-
dent Harding in 1923 set aside
37,000 square miles of the North
Slope as Naval Petroleum Re-
serve #4, and exploration con-
tinued in a desultory fashion in
13that area for many years. Still, the
industry's main interest centered
for some time around the major
Texas, Oklahoma and California
oil discoveries.
The real beginning of the state's
petroleum industry occurred in
1957 with the discovery of oil in
the Kenai Peninsula near An-
chorage. A decade later, five
fields were producing crude oil
and nine fields, natural gas. At
the beginning of this decade,
production in the Kenai area and
in the nearby Cook Inlet
amounted daily to 240,000 barrels
of oil and 600 million cubic feet
of natural gas-in each case, a
relatively small percentage of the
nation's total production.
Yet, with about $275 million in
total output annually, petroleum
has become Alaska's leading in-
dustry, by a considerable margin.
In addition to raw material pro-
duction, processing has become
increasingly important, especially
with the construction of a petro-
chemical complex in the Kenai
area. This includes two petro-
leum refineries producing jet,
diesel and heating fuels, plus an
ammonia-urea plant and a nat-
ural-gas liquefaction plant ser-
vicing the Japanese market.
Production in the Kenai area was
approaching its maximum level
when, fortuitously, a major find
in the Prudhoe Bay area occurred
in July 1968. Announcement of
the find set off a rush reminis-
cent of the Klondike Gold Rush
of 1898. Estimated reserves in the
field came to 10 billion barrels of
crude oil, as against Canada's 8
billion barrels and Texas' 15 bil-
lion barrels. Moreover, total re-
coverable reserves (with new
technology) were estimated at 50
billion barrels of oil and 300
trillion cubic feet of gas.
Only 3 companies (Atlantic Rich-
field, Humble and British Petro-
leum) originally had a stake in
this bonanza, on the basis of
three state lease sales in the 1964-
67 period. But the much-publi-
cized September 1969 sale of
leases drew many more bidders,
as 450,000 acres were set aside
for exploration. Based on earlier
transactions, this offering was
expected initially to elicit only
about $11 million in bids, but
instead it gave the state a $900-
million windfall, enough to cover
the entire cost of state govern-
ment for almost half a decade.
Problems of geography
Nonetheless, none of this oil is
likely to reach market until the
latter part of this decade, despite
all the discussion of shortages
throughout the nation. Several
factors have defeated efforts to
exploit the Prudhoe oil field, be-
ginning with geography. Almost
all of Alaska's prinCipal geo-
graphic features are arranged in
an east-west orientation, and this
affects the present structure of
the transportation network and
the future location of oil and gas
carriers.
The North Slope is a flat flood
plain with the water table practi-
cally at the ocean surface, and is
marked by sediment-filled
streams and numerous glacial
lakes. The entire area usually is
frozen solid from the two-foot
level down to about 300 feet.
South ofthat are the foothills and
then the Brooks Range,
stretching in an east-west direc-
tion across most of the state,
with only two low-level passes,
one of them across the border in
Canada. Farther south is the
Yukon Basin, consisting of a dry
plateau around Fairbanks and, to
the east, a vast area of semi-
frozen peat bog and muskeg that
is hundreds of feet deep in
places.
,i I, 14Next comes the Alaskan earth-
quake belt-a sweeping arc that
is the continuation of the Aleu-
tian Islands-and south of that
are the towering mountains of
the Alaskan Range. Two difficult
surface routes cross the moun-
tains between Fairbanks and the
port cities of South Central
Alaska. One of these routes,
between Fairbanks and Valdez,
rises 2800 feetin one short 20-
mile stretch. This contrasts
sharply with the relatively flat
Alaska highway route, which
stretches southeast into Canada.
Problems of environment
Bringing oil to marketthrough
such terrain is a difficult but not
insuperable technological task.
What complicated the situation
was a developmentwhich took
place in the same year as the
Alaska oil-lease sale-the pas-
sage of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969. The act
stipulates that when Federal
agencies undertake actions with
possible environmental conse-
quences, they must file an envi-
ronmental-impact report. In this
statement, known as a 102(c)
report, the agency involved must
analyze and quantify the effects
of proposed actions on the envi-
ronment, and also consider alter-
natives where irreversible dele-
terious effects are found.
Transportation experts proposed
a number of possible transporta-
tion modes-sea, air, rail, truck
and pipeline-to bring the oil to
market. The approved proposal,
however, was a 789-mile trans-
Alaska pipeline route developed
by the Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co., a consortium of seven oil
companies. This route, as origi-
nally proposed, would be from
Prudhoe Bay through Anaktuvuk
Pass in the Brooks Range, across
the Yukon River to Fairbanks,
and then through the difficult
terrain of the Alaskan Range,
along the route of the Richardson
Highway into Valdez. From Val-
dez, supertankers would carry
crude oil to Puget Sound and
California ports, and pipelines
then would deliver the oil to the
nation's major markets in the
East.
Several legal actions were filed
against the U.S. Department of
Interior (USDI) to enjoin the
granting of the pipeline permit to
the oil companies. One major
piece of litigation, concerning
the settlement of native land
claims, was eased by Congres-
sional action in 1971. This act set
aside 40 million acres of presum-
ably mineral-rich land for Alaskan
natives, and involved also the
payment of $962 million in cash,
to be disbursed indirectly to 12
regional and 200 village corpora-
tions.
Most of the litigation, however,
centered around the environ-
mental issue. The Interior De-
partment issued a preliminary
impact statement early in 1971,
and the pipeline companies fol-
lowed up in July of thatyear with
their own 29-volume environ-
mental study. After issuance of a
further detailed USDI study in
early 1972, Secretary Morton
granted a pipeline construction
permit, but this was then ap-
pealed to the courts by several
environmental groups. In early
1973, the Federal Court of Ap-
peals in Washington ruled that
the Secretary could not grant a
permit unless Congress amended
a 1920 law governing pipeline
rights-of-way across public land.
The Supreme Court refused to
review this lower-court ruling,
and the problem ended up in the
hands of Congress. The appro-
priate legislation is now nearing
passage, but further litigation
could develop before construc-
tion actually begins.
Canadian alternative?
Much ofthe controversy has cen-
tered around the feaSibility of an
alternative pipeline route
through Canada to Edmondton
and then on to Chicago, ser-
vicing the Oil-hungry Midwest.




15Environmentalists argued that a
hot-oil pipeline could create se-
rious dangers in crossing the
seismically active zone in the
southern part of the route, not to
mention the wide expanses of
permafrost in other stretches. In
addition, fisheries could suffer
from unavoidable leaks and spills
occuring atterminal facilities and
in the narrow and fog-laden sea
routes near Valdez. In rebuttal,
Alaska-route supporters argued
that the Canadian route, being
several times longer, would have
several times the environmental
impact ofthe Alaska route. The
Canadian route would not cross
as much seismically active terrain
or create dangers for marine
transportation, but it would in-
volve many more crossings of
large rivers. Moreover, each side
claimed that its pipeline was
much safer for caribou (bears,
moose, muskrats, otters, etc.)
than the opposition's line.
Congressmen and state officials,
and also some Canadian inter-
ests. Arrayed against them were
the major oil producers and trade
associations, Federal and Alaska

















Annual Flow (Million Bbls.)
Trans-Alaska pipeline, starting operations within several years'
time, could ease oil shortage much more than trans-Canada line
In terms of market analysis, the
Canadian route's supporters
argued thatthe U.S. West Coast
(District 5) would not be able to
absorb all of the crude oil
16shipped there by the Alaska
route, necessitating the mar-
keting of the surplus elsewhere.
Exporting the oil would have
been extremely profitable under
then-existing oil-import regula-
tions, but this is no longer true
with the recent easing of such
regulations. More importantly,
given the developing shortages
in all sections of the country, it is
unlikelythat there will be any
surplus in the West Coast when
the oil finally starts flowing three
or four years from now.
Inconclusive choice
Cost-benefit analyses were devel-
oped by both sides in the contro-
versy, but with rather inconclu-
sive results. The Canadian route's
supporters pointed to the fact
that crude-oil prices are higher in
the upper Midwest than in Cali-
fornia, and that present transpor-
tation-cost calculations indicated
that the value of North Slope oil
would be greater if delivered to
Chicago rather than to Los An-
geles. This conclusion favoring
the Canadian route, developed in
several studies by economist
Charles Cicchetti (Resources for
the Future), was challenged by a
Treasury study which Deputy
Secretary William Simon pre-
sented to the Senate Interior
Committee last May.
The Treasury study followed the
same benefit-cost approach uti-
lized by Cicchetti, but came out
with quite different results. "Ben-
efits" were defined as the cost of
alternative sources of supply less
the resource cost of North Slope
oil delivered to the same market;
"resource costs" were defined as
the total cost of goods and ser-
vices required to bring either
North Slope or foreign oil to U.S.
markets.
In the Treasury projections, the
delivered resource cost of
Middle Eastern crude oil in 1980
would be roughly $4.58 in Los
Angeles and $4.88 in Chicago.
(Future market prices would be
higher than these resource
costs.) In contrast, the delivered
resource cost of North Slope
crude oil, by either pipeline
route, would be roughly $1.30 in
Los Angeles and $1.60 in Chi-
cago. So the net benefit to the
U.S. economy from either pipe-
line from the production of
North Slope crude oil would be
$3.28 a barrel-the difference
between the resource costs of
foreign and Alaskan oil.
The difference in conclusion
stemmed from the fact that
Treasury analysts assumed that
any North Slope oil would dis-
place foreign oil in either market,
whereas Cicchetti assumed that it
would displace an even mixture
of domestic and foreign crude in
Los Angeles and a five-sixth one-
sixth mixture in Chicago-
perhaps unrealistically in view of
the shortage of domestic crude,
as seen from the recent upsurge
in imports and the U.S. industry's
current peak capacity produc-
tion. Basically, however, the
Treasury concluded thattotal
benefits (if notbenefits per
barrel) would be greater from the
Alaskan route simply because of
the earlier availability of oil from
that source.
Alaskan choice
In evaluating the various environ-
mental and economic arguments
supporting the two alternative
routes, the Senate Interior
Committee refused to accept ei-
ther set of arguments as conclu-
sive. However, the Committee
determined that "the trans-
Alaska pipeline is now clearly
preferable because it could be
on-stream two to six years earlier
than the comparable overland
pipeline across Canada." Be-
cause of the much more ad-
vanced planning on the Alaska
route, that pipeline could prob-
ably deliver a total of 8.6 billion
barrels by 1990, as against 5.0
billion barrels via the Canadian
route.
This argument apparently has
been convincing to Congress,
especially in the present crisis
atmosphere, and thus has helped
speed the necessary right-of-way
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legislation through the legislative
process. Yet in view of the large
unexploited resources available
on the North Slope, and in view
ofthe arguments favoring the
Canadian route, an ultimate solu-
tion might involve the construc-
tion of both pipelines. Already
planning is far advanced for con-
struction of a natural-gas line
from the North Slope through
Canada to the Midwest, and a
frequently mentioned alternative,
the construction of a rail-pipeline
corridor along this route, looks
increasingly promising.
Railroad alternative
The rail-transportation mode has
strong advocates, especially
among those taking a long-range
view of resource development.
This view has been outlined by
economist Richard Rice (Car-
negie-Mellon Institute) in a re-
cent article in Technology Re-
view. Rice argues in favor of a
high-capacity rail-pipeline route
along the Yukon Corridor, or
preferably along the Mackenzie
Valley, in place of the trans-
Alaska pipeJine, partly in terms of
short-term cost advantages but
also in terms of its long-range
value.
The cost estimates for the trans-
Alaska pipeline, in his view,
would total about $9.2 billion-
$3.0 billion for the crude-oil
pipeline, plus the costs of a nat-ural-gas line, tanker fleet and
port facilities. In contrast, the
estimated cost of the rail-pipeline
system would be about $7.5 bil-
lion on the Yukon route and $5.6
billion along the Mackenzie
route. Moreover, this system
would yield greater residual
value after the Prudhoe field is
finally exhausted.
Rice's proposal is apt to be over-
looked in the present rush to get
the oil flowing, yet over the long-
run, a rail-pipeline system may
become a necessity. The U.S.
and Canadian Arctic contains, in
addition to 10 billion barrels of
proven reserves in the Prudhoe
field, a great deal more that
could ultimately become recover-
able with improved technology-
perhaps 10 billion barrels in
Navel Petroleum Reserve #4,20
billion barrels in the area around
the Mackenzie Delta, and an-
other 30 to 40 billion barrels to
the east ofthe delta in Canada.
Most of these areas are not ac-
cessible to the trans-Alaska pipe-
line route, but they can conven-
iently be served by the
Mackenzie route proposed in
Rice's study.
The railway would also have an
essential role in developing other
natural resources of interior
Alaska, an area which could pro-
duce as much as two million tons
of iron ore, one million tons of
coal, one-half million tons of
other minerals, and, in addition,
over two billion board feet of
lumber every year. More than
that, in view of the nation's in-
creasing need for new energy
sources, the Mackenzie route
would be strategically located for
exploiting two of the three
largest known oil deposits in the
world. Recoverable reserves in
the Athabasca tar sands of Al-
berta are estimated at 370 billion
barrels of oil, about the same
amount as in the the entire Per-
sian Gulf area, and the shales of
Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming
might contain another 600 billion
barrels. As technology develops
to a point permitting exploitation
of these resources, marketing
development should not lag far
behind.
Impact of pipeline
However valid these considera-
tions may be in the distant fu-
ture, the present emphasis is on
bringing North Slope oil to
market through the trans-Alaska
pipeline. The oil will not start
flowing immediately; after con-
struction begins, itwill take three
years to bring the first shipment
to market, and several more be-
fore production reaches its tar-
geted flow of two million barrels
a day. But as the project goes on
stream, it will make an important
contribution to U.S. energy sup-
plies, since the North Slope field
by itself adds one-third to the
nation's oil reserves.
The impact on Alaska will be far-
reaching, and will mark a basic
shift in the state's passage from a
military-based economy to a re-
source-oriented economy. Even
at the beginning of this decade,
twice as many individuals were
on military payrolls as on the
payrolls of commodity-producing
industries (farms, fisheries, for-
ests, oil, construction and manu-
facturing), but the state's eco-
nomic structure should be quite
different in another decade or
two. The process of growth will
be very uneven and accompanied
by sharp cyclical swings in em-
ployment and income, but itwill
lead eventually to a better-inte-
grated and prosperous economy.
North Slope oil already has
brought about one abortive
boom, caused by the euphoric
belief that the pipeline would be
built immediately after conclu-
sion of the $900-million lease
sale. The state for the last several
years has lived with the let-down
from that burst of activity, with
the unemployment rate hovering
around 10 or 11 percent
throughout the past several
years, as against 9 percent or less
during most of the preceding
decade. (However, total employ-
19ment has grown somewhat faster
over the past half-decade than in
the preceding period.) But now
that the pipeline is closer to
reality, a major construction
boom is likely to occur.
This period might last about
three years, with pipeline-related
employment peaking at around
24,000 jobs in the second year
and falling off rapidly thereafter.
However, the higher-paid jobs
will probably be filled by special-
ized workers hired "Outside",
and not from the Alaskan labor
force, although the state govern-
ment is making every effort to
see that Alaskan residents get
first consideration for construc-
tion jobs. It is even considering
re-opening an information booth
at the Seattle airport which was
used during the slump several
years ago to warn Outsiders
away.
Impact of oil
Despite the bonanza in company
profits and tax revenues ex-
pected from exploitation of
North Slope resources, it may
not produce much in the way of
permanent employment of
Alaskan workers or direct busi-
ness for Alaskan firms. The fields
in the Kenai-Cooke Inlet area
have generated fewer than 3,000
permanent jobs, and with the
exploitation of North Slope
fields, perhaps no more than
20
5,000 permanent workers may be
needed for drilling, production,
pipeline and harbor work
throughout the state.
Thus, petroleum's long-run con-
tribution to the state's economic
developmentwill not depend
primarily on the jobs or the di-
rectly-related business generated
by the industry. Its contribution
instead will be determined
largely by the amount of revenue
the state receives from oil and
gas leases and taxes, and the way
in which it spends this revenue.
It should be added that the pe-
troleum industry differs consider-
ably from other commodity-pro-
ducing industries, such as the
salmon and forestry industries,
whose Alaskan operations have
been primarily seasonal and con-
centrated in production. The oil
firms have established an execu-
tive and administrative compo-
nent inside Alaska, giving an
Alaskan flavor to their main oper~
ating and planning functions, and
they also have relied heavily on
contracting for various sup-
porting services within the state.
Even so, the oil boom in itself
will not solve the state's major
problems of rural poverty and
high (9.8 percent) unemploy-
ment. These problems, according
to Arion Tussing (University of II
Alaska) are not caused by lack of
jobs in the ordinary sense, but by
two peculiarities of the state's
industrial structure: the exist-
ence of seasonal industries, such
as salmon and construction, and
the serious mismatch between
the location, education and life
styles of most natives (who make
up one-fifth of the population)
and the qualities required by
modern economic development.
The oil boom nonetheless has
stimulated the settlement of the
native-claims question, by has- II
tening the payment of $962 mil-
lion in cash and 40 million acres
of land to poverty-afflicted
groups. In addition, the $900 mil-
lion received from the 1969 lease
sale has gone into the state's
general fund to finance construc-
tion and maintenance of public
facilities. But the state has also
counted on severance taxes and
royalty income from oil produc-
tion, and these revenues have
not yet materialized. This s,itua-
tion has led to charges that the
state would "face bankruptcy" in
several more years, and it has led
to proposals in the governor's
1974 budget to develop new rev-
enue sources and to reduce the
rate of growth of state spending.Benefits of proprietorship
Despite these recent difficulties,
the prospects for the state gov-
ernment's finances-and for a
further attack on the state's
poverty-will brighten consider-
ably when oil begins to flow. This
evaluation is based on one cru-
cial fact: unlike other oil-pro-
ducing states, Alaska owns major
subsurface rights, and so can
participate in development reve-
nues from all mineral exploita-
tion within the state.
The oil firms and the state gov-
ernment have argued for some
time over the future shape ofthe
oil-taxation system. Basically,
however, the state will collect a
royalty on the wellhead price per
barrel produced, and itwill also
impose a sliding-scale production
tax, depending on the producing
rate of each well. Since the Pru-
dhoe Bay wells generally will
produce at a high rate, the state's
tax take could approximate 20
percent of the wellhead price per
barrel.
In a University of Alaska study
(The Alaska Pipeline Report) pro-
duced for the U.S. Department
of the Interior, the wellhead
price was estimated at $2.42 to
$2.52 per barrel, which at full
pipeline capacity of two million
barrels a day would generate
about one million dollars a day in
state revenue. However, the
study was based on 1971 prices,
so that in view of the rapid price
escalation resulting from the
world-wide oil squeeze-
involving a 9.7-percent jump in
the wholesale price of crude
within the past year alone-the
state's revenues (and the Alaskan
economy) should benefit sub-
stantially as time goes on.
The exploitation of North Slope
oil will increasingly broaden Alas-
ka's economic base. But to re-
peat, the long-term impact will
come not from construction of
the pipeline, but rather from the
utilization of production reve-
nues. (Most of the gains would
occur, no matterwhat route were
chosen to bring the oil to
market.) The shape of Alaska's
future will be determined largely
by the state government, through
its decisions on how and where
to spend its oil revenues, while
the Federal government's long-
dominant role will become only
secondary.
William Burke
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